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Abstract
We give a unified treatment of the convergence of random series and
the rate of convergence of strong law of large numbers in the framework
of game-theoretic probability of Shafer and Vovk [24]. We consider games
with the quadratic hedge as well as more general weaker hedges. The lat-
ter corresponds to existence of an absolute moment of order smaller than
two in the measure-theoretic framework. We prove some precise relations
between the convergence of centered random series and the convergence of
the series of prices of the hedges. When interpreted in measure-theoretic
framework, these results characterize convergence of a martingale in terms
of convergence of the series of conditional absolute moments. In order to
prove these results we derive some fundamental results on deterministic
strategies of Reality, who is a player in a protocol of game-theoretic proba-
bility. It is of particular interest, since Reality’s strategies do not have any
counterparts in measure-theoretic framework, ant yet they can be used to
prove results which can be interpreted in measure-theoretic framework.
Keywords and phrases: Kronecker’s lemma, law of the iterated logarithm,
Le´vy’s extension of Borel-Cantelli lemma, Marcinkiewicz-Zygmund strong law,
three-series theorem.
1 Introduction
In standard textbooks on measure-theoretic probability, the strong law of large
numbers (SLLN) is proved using Kronecker’s lemma. As a precondition for
Kronecker’s lemma, the convergence of a random series is usually stated in
the form of three-series theorem. Game-theoretic counterpart in Section 4.2 of
Shafer and Vovk ([24]) basically follows the same line of argument. However
game-theoretic forms of various conditions for convergence of random series have
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not been studied in detail. Indeed, game-theoretic counterparts of the standard
three-series theorem have to be stated more carefully than in the measure-
theoretic setting in several respects, such as the treatment of truncation of
random variables and the martingale nature of game-theoretic framework. In
particular we need to take into account Gilat’s counter example ([7], see also
[2], [3]) to three-series theorem for martingales.
In this paper we give a unified game-theoretic treatment of convergence of
random series and the rate of convergence of SLLN. We consider games with
the quadratic hedge. For an i.i.d. case in the terminology of measure-theoretic
probability, the law of the iterated logarithm (LIL) gives the precise rate. In
game-theoretic probability which corresponds to a non-identical case, the rate
of convergence may be slower. We give the precise rate in the game-theoretic
framework.
We also consider games with more general weaker hedges. Marcinkiewicz-
Zygmund strong law ([15], [8], [13]) suggests that the rate of convergence of
random series and SLLN should depend on the existence of moments. In Section
5 we will show that the rate is determined by the inverse function of the hedge
function.
In order to derive results on convergence of random series, we study some
topics. One topic is the set of convergence of a martingale. If a capital process is
required to be non-negative, the convergence theorem for a non-negative capital
process stated in [24] is sufficient. However it is useful to consider the set of
convergence for an arbitrary capital process which may be negative.
Another topic is deterministic strategies of Reality. We propose a notion
called “compliance” concerning deterministic strategies of Reality and prove
some results on them. In [24], Reality’s strategy is only briefly discussed. Fur-
thermore only randomized strategies of Reality are considered in Section 4.3 of
[24] and Section 7 of [13]. Our deterministic strategies of Reality can be under-
stood as “derandomizations” of the randomized strategies in [24] and [13]. It is
of interest that deterministic strategies of Reality, which do not have any coun-
terparts in measure-theoretic probability, can be used to prove results which
can be interpreted in measure-theoretic probability.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we consider sets of
convergence in the bounded forecasting game and establish preliminary results
on the implication of the convergence of a random series to the convergence of
the series of prices for Reality’s moves. We also treat the coin-tossing game
as a special case of the bounded forecasting game. In Section 3 we consider
bounded forecasting game with quadratic hedge and prove various results on
convergence of random series. In Section 4 we study the rate of convergence of
SLLN in unbounded forecasting game with quadratic hedge and in Section 5 we
generalize our results to games with more general weaker hedges. We end the
paper with some discussion on further topics in Section 6.
2
2 Preliminary results for bounded forecasting
game and the coin-tossing game
In this section we consider the bounded forecasting game of Section 3.3 of [24]
and the coin-tossing game as a special case. This section also serves as a brief
introduction to game-theoretic probability.
2.1 Definitions and some notions
Consider a perfect information game among three players: Forecaster, Skeptic
and Reality. Let C > 0 be given. Before the start of the game, Skeptic an-
nounces his initial capital K0 = D > 0. K0 ≡ 1 in Section 3.3 of [24], but
in this section, for our discussion of the bounded forecasting game, it is more
convenient to let Skeptic announce his initial capital K0 = D. Then, at each
round n = 1, 2, . . . , of the game, these players announce their moves in the or-
der: Forecaster, Skeptic and Reality. At each round, Forecaster first announces
mn, which is interpreted as the price for Reality’s move xn. Forecaster has to
announce a coherent price mn (Section 1.2 of [24]), that is, with the announced
price mn, Reality should always be able to prevent Skeptic from strictly in-
creasing his capital Kn for sure. Given the price, Skeptic then announces the
amount Mn he bets. Finally Reality announces her move xn ∈ [−C,C]. The
payoff to Skeptic at the n-th round is Mn(xn −mn) and his capital is updated
as Kn = Kn−1 +Mn(xn −mn).
More precisely, the protocol of bounded forecasting game is written as fol-
lows.
Bounded Forecasting Game
Parameter: C > 0
Players: Forecaster, Skeptic, Reality
Protocol:
Skeptic announces his initial capital K0 = D > 0.
FOR n = 1, 2, . . .:
Forecaster announces mn ∈ [−C,C].
Skeptic announces Mn ∈ R.
Reality announces xn ∈ [−C,C].
Kn := Kn−1 +Mn(xn −mn).
Collateral Duties: Skeptic must keep Kn non-negative. Reality
must keep Kn from tending to infinity.
Note that Forecaster’s price mn ∈ [−C,C] is clearly coherent, because Re-
ality can always choose xn = mn, so that Kn = Kn−1 irrespective of Mn.
A strategy P = {Pn}n≥1 of Skeptic specifies Mn, n ≥ 1, in terms of past
moves of other players mk, xk, k = 1, . . . , n− 1, and the current price mn:
Mn = Pn(m1, x1, . . . ,mn−1, xn−1,mn).
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We define the capital process KP = {KPn }n≥0 for a given strategy P recursively
by KP0 = 0 and
KPn = KPn−1 + Pn(m1, x1, . . . ,mn−1, xn−1,mn)(xn −mn), n ≥ 1.
KPn is the cumulative payoff to Skeptic up to round n under the strategy P
(without the initial capital K0 = D). With our definition, KP0 ≡ 0 is dis-
tinguished from the initial capital K0 = D announced by Skeptic. We call a
sequence of real-valued functions Sn(m1, x1, . . . , xn,mn) of m1, x1, . . . ,mn, xn,
n ≥ 0, a capital process if Sn = KPn for some strategy P .
An infinite sequence ξ = (m1, x1,m2, x2, . . . ) of moves of Forecaster and
Reality is called a path. Define the sample space
Ξ = {ξ = (m1, x1,m2, x2, . . . ) | mn, xn ∈ [−C,C], ∀n ≥ 1}
as the set of paths. We regard KP and P as functions of ξ. They are denoted
by KPn (ξ) and Pn(ξ), which actually depend only on prefixes of ξ of length 2n
and 2n− 1, respectively.
Any subset E of Ξ is called an event. We say that Skeptic can force E if
there exists a strategy P of Skeptic, such that
KPn (ξ) ≥ −1, ∀ξ ∈ Ξ, ∀n ≥ 0, (1)
and
ξ 6∈ E ⇒ lim sup
n
KPn (ξ) =∞.
In this paper we do not make the distinction between forcing (limnKPn = ∞)
and weak forcing (lim supnKPn = ∞) in view of Lemma 3.1 of [24]. A strategy
P satisfying (1) is called prudent, i.e., if Skeptic observes his collateral using P
with the initial capital K0 = 1.
For two events E1, E2 ⊂ Ξ, the event E1 ⇒ E2 stands for EC1 ∪ E2, where
EC1 is the complement of E1. E1 ⇔ E2 stands for both implications:
(EC1 ∪ E2) ∩ (E1 ∪ EC2 ) = (E1 ∩ E2) ∪ (EC1 ∩ EC2 ) = (E1∆E2)C ,
where ∆ denotes the symmetric difference. Note that E1 ⇔ E2 and EC1 ⇔ EC2
are the same as a subset of Ξ. In view of Lemma 3.1 of [24], Skeptic can force
E1 ⇔ E2 if and only if Skeptic can force both E1 ⇒ E2 and E2 ⇒ E1.
2.2 A set of convergence
Martingale convergence theorems in measure-theoretic probability state that
the limit of a martingale exists and is finite almost surely if the martingale is
bounded in L1. In Section VII.5 of [27] the set of convergence was studied when
the condition is not satisfied.
Game-theoretic probability also has convergence theorems. If a capital pro-
cess is required to be non-negative, the convergence theorem holds. However it
is useful to consider a strategy whose capital process may be negative in order
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to construct a strategy whose capital process is non-negative as we will do later.
Then we will prove a game-theoretic version of a simple case of results in [27].
The results are used in a later section.
Let P be a strategy of Skeptic. Denote the minimum possible gain Ln =
Ln(m1, x1, . . . ,mn−1, xn−1,mn) to Skeptic at the round n (after he knows Fore-
caster’s move mn) under P by
Ln = min
x∈[−C,C]
Pn(m1, x1, . . . ,mn−1, xn−1,mn)(x−mn)
=
{
Pn × (−C −mn) if Pn ≥ 0
Pn × (C −mn) otherwise.
For D > 0, we define the stopping time τDP = τ
D
P (ξ) as the first time D + KPn
may be negative:
τDP = min{n ≥ 1 : KP1 ≥ −D, . . . ,KPn−1 ≥ −D, KPn−1 + Ln < −D}.
As usual τDP = +∞ if the set on the right-hand side is empty. The truncation
PD of P at the loss −D is defined as
PDn (m1, x1, . . . ,mn) =
{
Pn(m1, x1, . . . ,mn) if n < τDP
0 otherwise.
Note that starting with the initial capital of D > 0, Skeptic observes his collat-
eral duty by employing PD, i.e., D +KPDn is always nonnegative.
We now prove the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1. Let P be any strategy in the bounded forecasting game. Let
BP denote the event
BP = {Pn is bounded } = {ξ | sup
n
|Pn(ξ)| <∞}. (2)
Skeptic can force
BP ⇒ (KPn converges in R or (lim sup
n
KPn = +∞ and lim infn K
P
n = −∞)
)
.
(3)
By “convergence in R” we mean that limn KPn exists and is finite. In later
statements we will omit “in R” for simplicity. Proposition 2.1 means that given
any strategy P , there exists another prudent strategy Q of Skeptic, such that
lim supnKQn =∞ if (3) is violated.
Proof. Note that the convergence or divergence of KPn is classified into the fol-
lowing five exclusive cases:
(i) −∞ < lim infnKPn = lim supnKPn <∞ (convergence),
(ii) −∞ < lim infnKPn < lim supnKPn <∞ (bounded oscillation),
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(iii) −∞ < lim infnKPn ≤ lim supnKPn =∞,
(iv) −∞ = lim infnKPn ≤ lim supnKPn <∞,
(v) −∞ = lim infnKPn , lim supnKPn =∞ (two-sided unbounded oscillation).
According to this classification, the sample space Ξ is partitioned into five sub-
sets EP1 , . . . , E
P
5 . By Lemma 3.2 of [24], it suffices to construct a prudent strat-
egy Q of Skeptic for each of the cases EPi , i = 2, 3, 4, such that ξ ∈ BP ∩ EPi
implies lim supnKQn =∞, i = 2, 3, 4.
We consider the case (iii) in detail. As noted above, for eachD > 0, D+KPDn
is always nonnegative. Consider dividing the initial capital of 1 into countably
infinite accounts with initial capitals 1/2+ 1/4+ · · · = 1. For the D-th account
with the initial capital of 1/2D, we apply the strategy PD/(D2D). The resulting
combined strategy Q is written as
Q =
∞∑
D=1
1
D2D
PD.
Then the capital process of Q is written as
1 +KQn =
∞∑
D=1
1
2D
+
∞∑
D=1
1
D2D
KPDn =
∞∑
D=1
1
D2D
(D +KPDn )
and henceQ is prudent. Now for each ξ ∈ BP∩E3, there exist positive constants
D1 = D1(ξ), D2 = D2(ξ), such that
KPn (ξ) > −D1(ξ), |Pn(ξ)| < D2(ξ), ∀n ≥ 1.
Then since |mn|, |xn| ≤ C
|Ln(ξ)| ≤ 2CD2(ξ), ∀n ≥ 1.
Consider D > D1(ξ) + 2CD2(ξ). Then for all n ≥ 1, we have
KPk (ξ) ≥ −D1(ξ) > −D, k = 1, . . . , n− 1,
and
KPn−1(ξ) + Ln(ξ) ≥ −D1(ξ)− 2CD2(ξ) > −D.
Hence for this D we have τDP (ξ) = ∞ and KPn = KP
D
n , ∀n ≥ 1. Therefore
ξ ∈ BP ∩ E3 ⇒ lim supnKQn (ξ) =∞. This proves the case of (iii).
The case (iv) is proved by the symmetry of the bounded forecasting protocol,
i.e. by considering −P instead of P .
Finally (ii) can be proved by the standard argument involving Doob’s up-
crossing lemma (see Lemma 4.5 of [24]). Note that Lemma 4.5 of [24] is for
the case of prudent P . In our case, P is not necessarily prudent. However
again combining truncations PD, D = 1, 2, . . . , with the argument of upcross-
ing lemma, we can construct a prudent Q such that lim supn KQn (ξ) = ∞ for
each ξ ∈ BP ∩ E2. This proves the proposition.
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We call a strategy P uniformly cautious if
sup
ξ∈Ξ,n≥1
|Pn(ξ)| <∞.
For uniformly cautious P , BP = Ξ. Therefore if P is uniformly cautious, then
Skeptic can force the right-hand side of (3). The reason for considering BP
in (2) and uniformly cautious strategies is that they eliminate doubling type
strategies.
Using Proposition 2.1 we can prove the following result, which is a general-
ization of results in Section 2.2.2 of [10].
Proposition 2.2. In the bounded forecasting game Skeptic can force∑
n
xn converges ⇒
∑
n
mn converges or
(lim sup
n
n∑
k=1
mk = +∞ and lim inf
n
n∑
k=1
mk = −∞) (4)
and∑
n
mn converges ⇒
∑
n
xn converges or
(lim sup
n
n∑
k=1
xk = +∞ and lim inf
n
n∑
k=1
xk = −∞) (5)
Proof. Let Yn =
∑n
k=1(xk −mk). Consider the uniformly cautious strategy P
such that Mn ≡ 1. Then KPn = Yn. By Proposition 2.1, Skeptic can force
Yn converges or (lim sup
n
Yn = +∞ and lim inf
n
Yn = −∞).
We separate the sums in Yn as Yn =
∑n
k=1 xk −
∑n
k=1mk and restrict relevant
events to the particular event E0 = {
∑
n xn converges}. Then clearly Skeptic
can force (4). (5) is proved similarly, by switching the roles of xn and mn.
2.3 Some applications
Consider the multi-dimensional bounded forecasting game (cf. [14]) defined as
follows. Reality’s move space is a compact set X of Rd. Forecaster’s move space
is the convex hull co(X ) of X and Skeptic’s move space is Rd. Denote the moves
by Forecaster, Skeptic and Reality by µn, mn and χn, respectively. The payoff
to Skeptic is mn · (χn − µn), where “·” denotes the standard inner product in
R
d. The protocol of the multi-dimensional bounded forecasting game is written
as follows.
Multi-dimensional Bounded Forecasting Game
Parameter: a compact region X ⊂ Rd
7
Players: Forecaster, Skeptic, Reality
Protocol:
Skeptic announces his initial capital K0 = D > 0.
FOR n = 1, 2, . . .:
Forecaster announces µn ∈ coX .
Skeptic announces mn ∈ Rd.
Reality announces χn ∈ X .
Kn := Kn−1 +mn · (χn − µn).
Collateral Duties: Skeptic must keep Kn non-negative. Reality
must keep Kn from tending to infinity.
It is easily seen that Proposition 2.1 holds in the multi-dimensional bounded
forecasting game.
We now consider the coin-tossing game and give a game-theoretic probability
version of Le´vy’s extension of Borel-Cantelli lemma. The protocol of the coin-
tossing game is written as follows.
Coin-tossing game
Protocol:
K0 = 1.
FOR n = 1, 2, . . .:
Forecaster announces pn ∈ [0, 1]
Skeptic announces Mn ∈ R.
Reality announces xn ∈ {0, 1}.
Kn := Kn−1 +Mn(xn − pn).
We have the following.
Example 2.3. (A game-theoretic version of Le´vy’s extension of Borel-Cantelli
lemma) In the coin-tossing game Skeptic can force∑
n
pn <∞ ⇐⇒
∑
n
xn <∞. (6)
Remark 2.4. The statement may be easier to understand if we rewrite it as
follows: Skeptic can force ∑
n
pn <∞⇒
∑
n
xn <∞
and ∑
n
pn =∞⇒
∑
n
xn =∞.
Coin-tossing game is a special case of the bounded forecasting game (with
C = D = 1), in such a way that the move space of Reality is restricted to {0, 1}
and the move space of Forecaster is restricted to [0, 1] by coherence. Therefore, if
Skeptic can force an event E in the bounded forecasting game, then Skeptic can
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force E in the coin-tossing game. In the coin-tossing game,
∑
n xn and
∑
n pn
are non-negative series and they either converge to finite values or diverge to
+∞. Therefore the case of two-sided unbounded oscillation on the right-hand
side of (4) and (5) is impossible, which implies that Skeptic can force (6).
Le´vy’s extension of Borel-Cantelli lemma in measure-theoretic probability is
usually stated as follows (cf. Theorem 12.15 of [31]).
Proposition 2.5. Let Xn, n = 1, 2, . . . , be a sequence of 0-1 random variables
adapted to filtration {Fn}. Let pn = E(Xn | Fn−1). Then almost surely
(i)
∑
n pn <∞ ⇒
∑
n xn <∞,
(ii)
∑
n pn =∞ ⇒ limN (
∑N
n=1 xn/
∑N
n=1 pn) = 1.
If we weaken (ii) to
∑
n pn =∞⇒
∑
n xn =∞, then the measure-theoretic
extension looks similar to Theorem 2.3. However there are some basic differ-
ences. In our setting, pn’s are only “prequentially” (eg. [30]) announced by
Forecaster and there is no need to specify the full probability measure on xn,
n = 1, 2, . . . . Also, in measure-theoretic framework the null set, where these
implications do not hold, may depend on the underlying probability measure.
On the other hand, in the game-theoretic setting, we have constructed an ex-
plicit strategy Q forcing (6) and the behavior of its capital process KQ on the
symmetric difference of two sets in (6) is explicitly understood. Furthermore in
Proposition 4.8 of Section 4 we will strengthen the rate of convergence in (ii).
3 Bounded forecasting game with quadratic hedge
The standard measure-theoretic three-series theorem involves truncation of ran-
dom variables and their means and variances. In considering game-theoretic
counterpart of the standard setup, we here consider the simple case that the
truncation is given before the game, i.e. we consider a variant of bounded fore-
casting game. In addition we assume that the quadratic hedge is available to
Skeptic. From now on for simplicity we assume K0 = 1. The protocol for this
section is written as follows.
Bounded Forecasting with Quadratic Hedge (BFQH)
Parameter: C > 0
Players: Forecaster, Skeptic, Reality
Protocol:
K0 = 1.
FOR n = 1, 2, . . .:
Forecaster announces mn ∈ [−C,C] and vn ∈ [0, C2 −m2n].
Skeptic announces Mn ∈ R and Vn ∈ R.
Reality announces xn ∈ [−C,C].
Kn := Kn−1 +Mn(xn −mn) + Vn((xn −mn)2 − vn).
Collateral Duties: Skeptic must keep Kn non-negative. Reality
must keep Kn from tending to infinity.
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In this protocol the following theorem holds.
Theorem 3.1. In BFQH Skeptic can force∑
n
vn <∞ ⇐⇒
∑
n
(xn −mn) converges.
Before giving a proof of this theorem, we discuss some features of the theorem
and the protocol BFQH.
The implication “
∑
n vn < ∞ ⇒
∑
n(xn −mn) converges” holds even for
the case of C = +∞, but the the converse implication does not hold for C =
+∞, as shown in Lemma 4.3 below. Therefore the main point of Theorem 3.1
is that Skeptic can force the equivalence of both sides in the case 0 < C < +∞.
In BFQH the ranges of Vn and vn are different from both the bounded
forecasting game in Section 3.1 of [24] and the unbounded forecasting game in
Section 4.1 of [24]. First, we allow Vn to be negative. In the usual unbounded
protocol, if Skeptic announces negative Vn then it violates his collateral duty
because Kn → −∞ as xn → ∞. However this does not happen in the above
protocol because |xn| ≤ C is bounded. Second, we restrict vn ∈ [0, C2−m2n] for
the game to be coherent. For example, consider the case mn = 0, vn = C
2 + ǫ
(ǫ > 0), Mn = 0 and Vn = −1, Then Kn = Kn−1 − x2n + C2 + ǫ ≥ Kn−1 + ǫ for
all xn ∈ [−C,C]. More precisely we should restrict mn and vn such that
mn =
∫
[−C,C]
zdpn and vn =
∫
[−C,C]
(z −mn)2dpn (7)
for some probability measure pn. For vn ∈ [0, C2−m2n] it is easily checked that
(7) holds for the two-point measure
pn({an}) = 1−mn/C
2
and pn({bn}) = 1 +mn/C
2
,
where an = mn + (−C −mn)
√
vn
C2−m2
n
and bn = mn + (C −mn)
√
vn
C2−m2
n
.
BFQH can be regarded as a variant of the two-dimensional bounded forecast-
ing game in Section 2.3 with an additional restriction at each round to Reality.
In the multi-dimensional bounded forecasting game let X = [−2C,C]× [0, 4C2],
µn = (mn, vn), mn = (Mn, Vn), χn = (xn, (xn −mn)2). Also at each round of
the game put an additional restriction to Reality’s move space depending on
Forecaster’s move as χn ∈ Xn = {(x, (x − mn)2)| − C ≤ x ≤ C}. Since the
restriction is advantageous to Skeptic, Proposition 2.1 holds for BFQH.
Now we give a proof of Theorem 3.1. We use the notation
Yn =
n∑
k=1
(xk −mk), Y0 = 0, An =
n∑
k=1
vk, A∞ =
∞∑
k=1
vk.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. (⇒) Consider a capital process
Tn = Y 2n −An = 2
n∑
k=1
Yk−1(xk −mk) +
n∑
k=1
((xk −mk)2 − vk),
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for Skeptic’s strategy Mn = 2Yn−1 and Vn = 1. An is the compensator for Y
2
n .
Then by Lemma 4.6 and Lemma 4.7 of [24], Skeptic can force that Yn converges.
(⇐) Although the argument for this implication is essentially the same as the
first part, we can not directly apply Lemma 4.6 of [24]. We prove this implication
by Proposition 2.1. Consider Skeptic’s strategy
P0 :Mn = −2Yn−1, Vn = −1 ≤ 0,
which is the negative of the above strategy. The capital process of P0 is given
as KP0n = An−Y 2n . Note that BP0 of Proposition 2.1 for this strategy is the set
of paths such that {Yn} is bounded. Therefore by a multi-dimensional version
of Proposition 2.1, Skeptic can force
{Yn} is bounded ⇒
(
An − Y 2n converges or
(lim sup
n
(An − Y 2n ) = +∞ and lim infn (An − Y
2
n ) = −∞)
)
.
(8)
By assumption Yn converges. Then {Yn} is bounded. Also Y 2n converges. Fur-
thermore since An is non-decreasing, the second case of the right-hand side
of (8) is impossible. Therefore Skeptic can force the event: Yn converges
⇒ A∞ <∞.
In Theorem 3.1 we considered the convergence of the series
∑
n(xn −mn).
In standard measure-theoretic probability theory, in the bounded case, the se-
ries is split as
∑
n(xn − mn) =
∑
n xn −
∑
nmn. Then the convergence of∑
n xn is discussed in terms of convergence of
∑
nmn and
∑
n vn. Two-series
theorem (see e.g. [27]) says that, under the assumption of independence,
∑
n xn
converges if and only if
∑
n vn converges and
∑
nmn converges. However, with-
out the assumption of independence, the case where
∑
nmn does not converge
and
∑
n vn = ∞, is very subtle. Indeed, Gilat [7] showed a counter example
which implies that there exists no condition on the conditional expectations and
conditional variances of a series of uniformly bounded random variables which
is necessary and sufficient for the sum to converge almost surely. We give a
game-theoretic version of Gilat’s result.
Theorem 3.2. In BFQH there is no set D of infinite sequences of Forecaster’s
moves such that Skeptic can force
(m1, v1,m2, v2, . . .) ∈ D ⇐⇒
∑
n
xn converges. (9)
First we explain the intuition behind the proof. The following is Gilat’s
example. Let {Zn} be the sequence of independent random variables with
P{Zn = n−1/2} = 1
2
= P{Zn = −n1/2} for n ≥ 1,
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and Z0 = 0. Then Zn → 0 and
∑
n Zn does not converge almost surely. Let
Xn = Zn−Zn−1 and Yn = −Zn−Zn−1 for n ≥ 1. Then the conditional means
and the conditional variances of Xn are the same as those of Yn. Furthermore∑n
k=1Xk = Zn → 0 and
∑n
k=1 Yk = −2
∑n−1
k=1 Zk−Zn does not converge almost
surely.
We want to show that a strategy forcing (9) yields a contradiction. Intu-
itively, if Skeptic can force an event E, then a “typical” or “random” sequence
should satisfy E. Pick up a typical realization {ηn} of {Zn}. Then ηn → 0
and
∑
n ηn does not converge. The sequence {xn} = {ηn− ηn−1} is also typical
for {Xn}. Then
∑n
k=1 xk = ηn → 0 and (m1, v1,m2, v2, . . .) ∈ D. Further-
more {yn} = {−ηn − ηn−1} is typical for {Yn}. Then
∑
n yn does not converge
and (m1, v1,m2, v2, . . .) 6∈ D. This is a contradiction. Since Forecaster knows
the previous moves of Reality, the first randomness does not imply the second
and third randomness in game-theoretic probability. Hence we construct three
strategies and pick up a random sequence for the strategies.
Proof. Assume that there exists a set D and a (prudent) strategy Q by which
Skeptic can force that
(m1, v1,m2, v2, . . .) ∈ D ⇐⇒ Sn converges. (10)
We prove that this assumption yields a contradiction.
Also fix a (prudent) strategy P of Skeptic that forces∑
n
vn <∞ ⇐⇒
∑
n
(xn −mn) converges. (11)
Such a strategy exists by Theorem 3.1.
Let a ∈ N be a positive constant large enough to satisfy 0 < (a − 1)−1/2 +
a−1/2 ≤ C and define
ωn = (n+ a)
−1, n ≥ 1.
Then ω
1/2
n−1 + ω
1/2
n < (a− 1)−1/2 + a−1/2 ≤ C. Hence
ω
1/2
n−1 + ω
1/2
n < C and ωn−1 + ωn < C
2.
We construct two strategies Q1 and Q2 for Skeptic from Q. At round n,
Skeptic by Q announces MQn and V Qn . These values depend on the moves of
Forecaster and Reality until the previous round and the moves of Forecaster at
the current round. So we write
MQn =M
Q
n (m1, v1, x1, . . . ,mn−1, vn−1, xn−1,mn, vn),
V Qn = V
Q
n (m1, v1, x1, . . . ,mn−1, vn−1, xn−1,mn, vn).
Define Q1 and Q2 by
MQ1n =M
Q
n (−η0, ω1, η1 − η0,−η1, ω2, η2 − η1, . . . ,−ηn−1, ωn),
V Q1n =V
Q
n (−η0, ω1, η1 − η0,−η1, ω2, η2 − η1, . . . ,−ηn−1, ωn),
MQ2n =−MQn (−η0, ω1,−η1 − η0,−η1, ω2,−η2 − η2, . . . ,−ηn−1, ωn),
V Q2n =V
Q
n (−η0, ω1,−η1 − η0,−η1, ω2,−η2 − η2, . . . ,−ηn−1, ωn),
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where η0 = 0 and |ηn| = ω1/2n . The sign of ηn will be defined below in (12). Since
the sign of ηn is not defined yet, Q1 and Q2 are not defined yet. However, we
have −ηn−1 ∈ [−C,C], ωn ∈ [0, C2−η2n−1] = [0, C2−ωn−1] and |±ηn−ηn−1| ≤
ηn+ ηn−1 = ω
1/2
n +ω
1/2
n−1 ≤ C. Hence, if the sign of ηk is defined for each k < n,
then MQ1n , V
Q1
n , M
Q2
n and V
Q2
n are defined, because M
Q
n and V
Q
n are defined
for mn ∈ [−C,C], vn ∈ [0, C2 −m2n] and xn ∈ [−C,C].
The strategies of Q1 and Q2 are explained as follows. Q1 moves as Q moves
when Forecaster’s moves are specified as
mn = −ηn−1, vn = ωn
and Reality announces ηn− ηn−1. Similarly Q2 moves as Q when mn = −ηn−1,
vn = ωn and Reality announces −ηn−ηn−1 with the minus sign in the definition
of MQ2n .
Define a Skeptic’s strategy T by T = (P +Q1 +Q2)/3 and define (the sign
of) ηn, n ≥ 1, by
ηn =
{
ω
1/2
n if MTn ≤ 0
−ω1/2n otherwise.
(12)
We claim that (for a given P) T and ηn are defined by mutual induction. Note
that η0 is already defined as 0. At round n, ηk has been defined for each k < n.
Then MQ1n and M
Q2
n are defined. Hence M
T
n is defined. It follows that ηn is
defined. By induction T and ηn are defined.
The capital process Kn is completely determined by strategies for Forecaster,
Skeptic and Reality. By KF ,S,Rn we denote the capital at round n when Fore-
caster uses the strategy F , Skeptic S and Reality R. In this proof we use the
following strategies for Forecaster:
F1 : mn = 0, vn = ωn,
F2 : mn = −ηn−1, vn = ωn,
and for Reality:
R1 : xn = ηn,
R2 : xn = ηn − ηn−1,
R3 : xn = −ηn − ηn−1.
We claim mn ∈ [−C,C], vn ∈ [0, C2 − m2n] and xn ∈ [−C,C] for each case.
For F1, vn = ωn < C2 and vn ∈ [0, C2] = [0, C2 − m2n]. For F2, m2n =
η2n−1 = ωn−1 < C
2 and mn ∈ [−C,C], vn = ωn < C2 − ωn−1 = C2 −m2n and
vn ∈ [0, C2 −m2n]. For R1, x2n = η2n = ωn < C2 and xn ∈ [−C,C]. For R2 and
R3, x2n ≤ (ηn + ηn−1)2 ≤ ((a− 1)−1/2 + a−1/2)2 ≤ C2 and xn ∈ [−C,C].
Case I. Consider the case that Forecaster uses the strategy F1, Skeptic uses
T , and Reality uses R1.
Consider the capital KF1,T ,R1n . By the definition of ηn in (12), MTn ηn ≤ 0
and η2n − ωn = 0 for all n. Hence
KF1,T ,R1n = KF1,T ,R1n−1 +MTn ηn + V Tn (η2 − ωn) ≤ KF1,T ,R1n−1
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for all n and KF1,T ,R1n is monotone non-increasing in this case. Then
KF1,P,R1n +KF1,Q1,R1n +KF1,Q2,R1n ≤ 3. (13)
We will prove
KF1,Q1,R1n = KF2,Q,R2n and KF1,Q2,R1n = KF2,Q,R3n (14)
for all n. Then by prudence of P and Q, the three capitals KF1,P,R1n , KF1,Q1,R1n
and KF1,Q2,R1n are all non-negative. Hence they are bounded by (13).
When Forecaster uses F1,
∑
nmn = 0 and
∑
n vn = ∞. By the property
(11) of P and the boundedness of KF1,P,R1n ,
∑
n(ηn −mn) =
∑
n ηn does not
converge. Note that ηn converges to 0.
Case II. Consider the case that Forecaster uses F2, Skeptic Q and Reality
R2. In this case
Sn =
n∑
k=1
xn =
n∑
k=1
(ηk − ηk−1) = ηn,
hence it converges. By the property (10) of Q and the boundedness of KF2,Q,R2n ,
we have (−η0, ω1,−η1, ω2, . . .) ∈ D.
Case III. Consider the case that Forecaster uses F2, Skeptic Q and Reality
R3. In this case
Sn =
n∑
k=1
xn =
n∑
k=1
(−ηk − ηk−1) = −2(
n∑
k=1
ηk) + ηn
hence it does not converge. Similarly, by the property (10) of Q and the bound-
edness of KF2,Q,R3n , we have (−η0, ω1,−η1, ω2, . . .) 6∈ D. This is a contradiction.
It remains to show the equations (14), that is,
KF1,Q1,R1n = KF2,Q,R2n and KF1,Q2,R1n = KF2,Q,R3n
for all n. We prove this by induction. For n = 0, we have KF1,Q1,R1n =
KF2,Q,R2n = KF1,Q2,R1n = KF2,Q,R3n = 1. Suppose KF1,Q1,R1n−1 = KF2,Q,R2n−1 and
KF1,Q2,R1n−1 = KF2,Q,R3n−1 . Then
KF1,Q1,R1n =KF1,Q1,R1n−1 +MQ1n ηn + V Q1n (η2n − ωn)
=KF2,Q,R2n−1 +MQn (ηn − ηn−1 − (−ηn−1))
+ V Qn ((ηn − ηn−1 − (−ηn−1))2 − ωn)
=KF2,Q,R2n ,
KF1,Q2,R1n =KF1,Q2,R1n−1 +MQ1n ηn + V Q1n (η2n − ωn)
=KF2,Q,R3n−1 −MQn ηn + V Qn (η2n − ωn)
=KF2,Q,R3n−1 +MQn (−ηn − ηn−1 − (−ηn−1))
+ V Qn ((−ηn − ηn−1 − (−ηn−1))2 − ωn)
=KF2,Q,R3n .
This completes the proof.
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Therefore we are interested in when we can determine the convergence of∑
n xn by
∑
nmn and
∑
n vn, and when we can not. From Theorem 3.1 com-
bined with Proposition 2.2, we can easily prove the following relations.
Corollary 3.3. In BFQH Skeptic can force the following events:
(i)
∑
nmn converges and
∑
n vn <∞⇒
∑
n xn converges,
(ii)
∑
nmn does not converge and
∑
n vn <∞⇒
∑
n xn does not converge,
(iii)
∑
nmn converges and
∑
n vn =∞⇒
∑
n xn does not converge.
(iv)
∑
n xn converges⇒
(
(
∑
nmn converges and
∑
n vn <∞) or
(lim sup
n
n∑
k=1
mk =∞, lim inf
n
n∑
k=1
mk = −∞ and
∑
n
vn =∞)
)
(15)
(i) and (ii) follow from (⇒) of Theorem 3.1, (iii) follows from (⇐) of Theorem
3.1 and (iv) follows from the fact that if Skeptic can force an event E in the
bounded forecasting game, then he can force E in BFQH.
In the classical three-series theorem, the second case of the right-hand side of
(15) is eliminated by the assumption of independence of the random variables.
In view of Gilat’s counter example, it seems that a simple general statement for
the game-theoretic framework can not be given for this case. However in some
special cases, where the behaviors of
∑
nmn and
∑
n vn are simple, we can give
definite statements. In Corollary 3.4 and Corollary 3.5 we discuss such cases.
One simple case is that Reality’s move xn is restricted to be non-negative.
Corollary 3.4. (One-sided BFQH) Consider the following special case: xn ∈
[0, C] in BFQH. Then Skeptic can force∑
n
mn converges and
∑
n
vn converges ⇔
∑
n
xn converges
This corollary easily follows because by coherence mn ≥ 0 and and
∑
nmn
is a non-negative series, which eliminates the second case on the right-hand side
of (4).
We now consider the case that the move space of Reality is restricted to be
a set of three points (trinomial game, cf. [18]). This case will play an essential
role in Section 4.3. Indeed the counter examples to SLLN in Section 4.3 of [24]
and Section 7 of [13] are constructed as probability distributions on a set of
three points.
Corollary 3.5. (Trinomial Game) We consider the following special case in
BFQH:
mn = 0, vn ∈ [0, 1], xn ∈ {0,±1}.
Then Skeptic can force∑
n
vn <∞ ⇐⇒ xn = 0 for all but finite n.
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Proof. This follows from Theorem 3.1 because for xn ∈ {0,±1},
∑
n xn con-
verges if and only if xn = 0 for all but finite n.
For the rest of this section we again consider the coherence of BFQH men-
tioned just after Theorem 3.1 in relation to Corollary 3.5. The coherence can
also be proved by a direct calculation as follows. If Vn ≥ 0 then Reality an-
nounces xn = mn. Then Mn(xn −mn) + Vn((xn −mn)2 − vn) ≤ 0. Suppose
Vn < 0. If mn ≥ Mn2Vn then Reality announces xn = −C. Then
Mn(xn −mn) + Vn((xn −mn)2 − vn)
≤Mn(−C −mn) + Vn((−C −mn)2 − (C2 −m2n))
=−Mn(C +mn) + 2Vnmn(C +mn)
=(2Vnmn −Mn)(C +mn) ≤ 0.
If Vn < 0 and mn ≤ Mn2Vn then Reality announces xn = C. The calculation is
the same as above. This fact is important for our argument in Section 4.3, so
we state it as a proposition.
Proposition 3.6. BFQH remains coherent even with the restriction xn ∈
{mn,±C}.
4 The rate of convergence of SLLN
In this section we consider the rate of convergence of SLLN in the usual un-
bounded forecasting game with quadratic hedge.
Unbounded Forecasting
Players: Forecaster, Skeptic, Reality
Protocol:
K0 = 1.
FOR n = 1, 2, . . .:
Forecaster announces mn ∈ R and vn > 0.
Skeptic announces Mn ∈ R and Vn ≥ 0.
Reality announces xn ∈ R.
Kn := Kn−1 +Mn(xn −mn) + Vn((xn −mn)2 − vn).
Collateral Duties: Skeptic must keep Kn non-negative. Reality
must keep Kn from tending to infinity.
As in the last section we use the notation Yn =
∑n
k=1(xk − mk), An =∑n
k=1 vk and A∞ = limnAn. In many cases we assume that mn = 0 for all n
without loss of generality.
4.1 Motivation
The rate of convergence of SLLN for i.i.d. case was completely solved by LIL of
Hartman and Wintner [9]. We refer to [23].
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Theorem 4.1 (Hartman-Wintner’s law of the iterated logarithm). Let {Xn}
be a sequence of independent identically distributed random variables with zero
mean and finite variance σ2. We put Sn =
∑n
k=1Xk, an = (2n log logn)
1/2.
Then
lim supSn/an = σ a.s., lim inf Sn/an = −σ a.s.
The theorem was a generalization of the case of binary sequences by Khinchin
[11]. If we drop the condition of i.i.d., we need some additional conditions.
Theorem 4.2 (Kolmogorov [12]). Let {Xn} be a sequence of independent ran-
dom variables with zero means and finite variances. Put σ2n = VarXn and
Bn =
∑n
k=1 σ
2
k. Suppose Bn →∞. Suppose also that there exists a sequence of
positive constants {Mn} such that
Mn = o
((
Bn
log logBn
)1/2)
and
|Xn| ≤Mn a.s.
Then
lim sup
Sn
(2Bn log logBn)1/2
= 1 a.s.
Some other condition for LIL than in Theorem 4.2 is given in [29] and LIL
for martingales are discussed for example in [28] and [5]. For game-theoretic
LIL see Chapter 5 of [24] and a recent paper by Takazawa [25].
In game-theoretic probability we can not assume that the sequence {xn} an-
nounced by Reality is i.i.d. Furthermore we can not assume the existence ofMn
either such that |xn| ≤ Mn. From now on we consider the rate of convergence
of SLLN in game-theoretic probability. In the view point of measure-theoretic
probability it is the rate of convergence of SLLN in a non-identical case.
4.2 Results on convergences in unbounded forecasting
Here we derive several results on the rate of convergence of Kronecker’s lemma
and hence the strong law of large numbers.
Lemma 4.3. In the unbounded forecasting Skeptic can force
∑
n
vn <∞⇒
n∑
k=1
(xk −mk) converges.
Skeptic can not force
n∑
k=1
(xk −mk) converges⇒
∑
n
vn <∞.
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Proof. The proof of the first statement is exactly the same as the proof of (⇒)
in Theorem 3.1. For the second statement, consider Reality’s strategy xn = mn,
∀n. Then Kn = K0 −
∑n
k=1 Vkvk and clearly Skeptic has no control over vn’s
and hence can not achieve
∑
n vn <∞.
Theorem 4.4. Let g be a positive increasing function. In the unbounded fore-
casting Skeptic can force∑
n
vn
g(An)
<∞⇒
∑
k≤n
xk −mk√
g(Ak)
converges. (16)
Proof. We assume that mn = 0 for all n without loss of generality. We consider
the capital process
Wn =
∑
k≤n
xk√
g(Ak)
.
The compensator of W 2 is
Bn =
n∑
k=1
vk
g(Ak)
.
If B∞ <∞, then Wn converges by Lemma 4.6 and Lemma 4.7 in [24].
Corollary 4.5. Let g be a positive increasing function on [0,∞) with g(∞) =
∞. Skeptic can force
∑
n
vn =∞ and
∑
n
vn
g(An)
<∞⇒
∑
k≤n(xk −mk)√
g(An)
→ 0. (17)
Proof. This follows easily from Theorem 4.4 and Kronecker’s lemma.
In some cases we can drop
∑
n vn/g(An) < ∞ from (17). The following is
an example.
Corollary 4.6. Let g be a positive increasing function such that∫ ∞
0
1
g(x)
dx <∞.
Then Skeptic can force
A∞ =∞⇒
∑
k≤n(xk −mk)√
g(An)
→ 0.
Proof. It suffices to show that
∑
n vn/g(An) < ∞ when A∞ = ∞. This holds
because ∫ ∞
0
1
g(x)
dx =
∞∑
n=1
∫ An
An−1
1
g(x)
dx ≥
∞∑
n=1
vn
g(An)
.
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Example 4.7. We write lni to mean the function such that lni(x) = ln(lni−1(x))
and ln0(x) = x defined recursively. Let
gi(x) := (
i∏
j=0
lnj)× lni(x).
In other words,
g0(x) = x
2, g1(x) = x(ln x)
2, g2(x) = x lnx(ln lnx)
2.
Then ∫
1
gi(x)
dx = − 1
lni x
.
Hence Skeptic can force
A∞ =∞⇒
∑
k≤n(xk −mk)√
gi(An)
→ 0
for all i.
For example, consider the special case vn ≡ v. Then A∞ =∞ is automatic
and with g2(x) above we have
∑
k≤n(xk −mk)/(
√
n lnn ln lnn)→ 0.
Note that it does not follow
∑
k≤n(xk − mk)/
√
n lnn ln lnn → 0. This is
because
∑
n
1
n lnn ln lnn =∞. However this does not mean that Theorem 4.4 is
a weaker result compared to LIL. Recall that we are considering a non-identical
case in the measure-theoretic point of view. In fact Theorem 4.4 is strict as we
will see in the next subsection.
We now apply Corollary 4.5 to the coin-tossing game. We first show that
the coin-tossing game is a special case of BFQH. Restrict xn ∈ {0, 1}, mn =
pn ∈ [0, 1] and vn = pn(1 − pn) in BFQH. For M,V ∈ R, p ∈ [0, 1], consider
M(x− p) + V ((x− p)2 − p(1− p))
For both x = 0 and x = 1 we have (x−p)2−p(1−p) = (x−p)(1−2p). Therefore
M(x− p) + V ((x− p)2 − p(1− p)) =M(x− p) + V (x− p)(1 − 2p)
= (M + V (1− 2p))(x − p).
By considering Skeptic’s move Mn + Vn(1 − 2pn), we see that BFQH for xn ∈
{0, 1} reduces to the coin-tossing game. Therefore from Corollary 4.6 applied
to the coin-tossing game, we have the following result.
Proposition 4.8. Let g be a positive increasing function such that
∫∞
0
1
g(x)dx <
∞. Let A¯n =
∑n
k=1 pk. Then in the coin-tossing game Skeptic can force
A¯∞ =∞⇒
∑
k≤n(xk − pk)√
g(A¯n)
→ 0.
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Proof. Let An =
∑n
k=1 pk(1− pk). Then An ≤ A¯n. If A∞ = A¯∞ =∞, then by
Corollary 4.6 Skeptic can force
∑
k≤n(xk − pk)√
g(A¯n)
=
∑
k≤n(xk − pk)√
g(An)
√
g(An)
g(A¯n)
→ 0.
On the other hand, if A∞ < A¯∞ = ∞, then Skeptic can force the convergence
of
∑
n(xn − pn). However in this case
∑
k≤n(xk − pk)/
√
g(A¯n) → 0, because
g(∞) =∞.
Note that Proposition 4.8 strengthens (ii) of Remark 2.5, which only states
A¯∞ =∞⇒
∑
k≤n(xk − pk)
A¯n
=
∑
k≤n xk∑
k≤n pk
− 1→ 0.
4.3 Results on divergence in unbounded forecasting
As the converse to the convergence result in the previous subsection, we will
prove that Skeptic can not force the convergence on the right-hand side of (16)
when
∑
n vn/g(An) =∞. The novelty in our approach is that in order to prove
this fact we use deterministic strategies of Reality.
We formulate Reality’s strategies and introduce the notion of compliance of
Reality with an event. We propose to use the term “compliance” for Reality’s
strategies and reserve the word “forcing” to Skeptic for clarity of our arguments.
Skeptic’s forcing an event E means that Reality has to move so that E happens
in order that Skeptic’s capital stays bounded. In contrast Reality’s forcing an
eventE means intuitively that Reality canmove so that E happens and Skeptic’s
capital stays bounded irrespective of the moves of Forecaster and Skeptic. In
other words Reality conforms to E and adapts as requested.
For notational simplicity, as in the multi-dimensional bounded forecasting
game, write µn = (mn, vn), mn = (Mn, Vn). Consider Reality’s strategy R =
{Rn}n≥1 which determines Reality’s move xn based on the moves µk,mk, k ≤ n,
of Forecaster and Skeptic:
xn = Rn(µ1,m1, . . . , µn,mn), n ≥ 1.
Definition 4.9. By a strategy R Reality complies with the event E ⊂ Ξ, if
(i) irrespective of the moves µn,mn, n ≥ 1, of Forecaster and Skeptic, both
observing their collateral duties, it holds that
(µ1,R1(µ1,m1), µ2,R2(µ1,m1, µ2,m2), . . . ) ∈ E,
and
(ii) supnKn <∞.
20
We say that by R Reality strongly complies with E if the supremum in (ii) is
uniformly bounded from above by 1 = K0, i.e., Kn ≤ 1 irrespective of the moves
of Forecaster and Skeptic, both observing their collateral duties.
We simply say that Reality (strongly) complies with the event E ⊂ Ξ if there
exists a strategy R such that by R Reality (strongly) complies with E.
Concerning the notion of compliance we prove the following fundamental
proposition.
Proposition 4.10. In the unbounded forecasting, if Skeptic can force an event
E, then Reality strongly complies with E.
Remark 4.11. As seen in the proof of this proposition below, the statement holds
not only for the unbounded forecasting, but for more general protocols of game-
theoretic probability, including the trinomial game.
The idea of the proof is as follows. First of all Reality needs to prevent the
capital from tending to infinity. By coherence this is possible for Reality. Next
the path must be in E. Since Skeptic can force E, Skeptic has the strategy such
that if the path is not in E, then the capital goes to infinity. It follows that if
the capital does not tend to infinity, then the path is in E. Then all Reality has
to do is to prevent the capital of the strategy from tending to infinity. Again by
coherence this is possible for Reality. Can Reality prevent the capitals of two
strategies from tending to infinity? It is possible by considering the strategy
that is the average of two strategies. In other words Reality’s strategy can
be constructed by considering a single sufficiently powerful strategy of Skeptic.
Furthermore Reality’s strategy can be deterministic. To make the strategy
“strongly” comply we need a more precise argument as is in the proof.
Such an argument is commonly used in algorithmic randomness. Especially
some examples of random sets are sets on which a single sufficiently powerful
(super)martingale fails. See [19, 6, 16, 20, 17]. One way to obtain a set on
which the (super)martingale fails is to choose the leftmost non-ascending path
in binary sequences. This choice corresponds to the coherence in game-theoretic
probability. Although the constructed random sets may not be computable in
general, it can be constructed deterministically by the (super)martingale.
We set up some more notation for clarity. When the moves of all the players
are individually specified we write Skeptic’s capital as
Kn[(µk,mk, xk)nk=1)], (K0 = 1).
In this notation Skeptic’s capital under a strategy P is written as
1 +KPn = Kn[(µk,Pk, xk)nk=1].
We now give a proof of Proposition 4.10.
Proof. Since Skeptic can force E, there exists Skeptic’s strategy P such that
lim sup
n
KPn <∞⇒ (µn, xn)∞n=1 ∈ E. (18)
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First we give a strategy R of Reality such that Kn is uniformly bounded from
above by 1 + ǫ, where ǫ > 0 is arbitrarily fixed.
Consider Reality’s move at the first round n = 1 after Forecaster’s move µ1 =
(m1, v1) and Reality’s move m1 = (M1, V1) were announced. Write P1(µ1) =
P1((m1, v1)) = (MP1 , V P1 ), which is the move of the strategy P at the first
round. Let α = 1/(1 + ǫ) and let
m˜1 = (M˜1, V˜1) = (1− α)(MP1 , V P1 ) + α(M1, V1).
Because of coherence, Reality can (deterministically) choose x1 such that
K1[µ1, m˜1, x1] = (1− α)K1[µ1,P1(µ1), x1] + αK1[µ1,m1, x1]
≤ K0 = 1.
Since both K1[µ1,P1(µ1), x1],K1[µ1,m1, x1] are non-negative, it follows that
K1[µ1,P1(µ1), x1] ≤ 1
1− α =
1 + ǫ
ǫ
, K1[µ1,m1, x1] ≤ 1
α
= 1 + ǫ.
We now make an inductive argument. Suppose that Reality could determin-
istically choose x1, . . . , xn−1 such that
Kn−1[(µk,Pk, xk)n−1k=1 ] ≤
1 + ǫ
ǫ
, Kn−1[(µk,mk, xk)n−1k=1 ] ≤ 1 + ǫ.
As in the first round define
m˜n = (M˜n, V˜n) = (1− α)(MPn , V Pn ) + α(Mn, Vn),
where (Mn, Vn) = mn is the actual move announced by Skeptic and (M
P
n , V
P
n )
is the move of strategy P . By coherence, Reality can now choose xn such that
M˜n(xn −mn) + V˜n((xn −mn)2 − vn) ≤ 0.
Then
Kn[(µk, m˜k, xk)nk=1] = (1 − α)Kn[(µk,Pk, xk)nk=1] + αKn[(µk,mk, xk)nk=1]
≤ Kn−1[(µk, m˜k, xk)n−1k=1 ]
≤ 1. (19)
Thus as in the first round
Kn[(µk,Pk, xk)nk=1] ≤
1 + ǫ
ǫ
, Kn[(µk,mk, xk)nk=1] ≤ 1 + ǫ. (20)
By (18) and the first term of (20), (i) of Definition 4.9 is satisfied. By the second
term of (20), Kn[(µk,mk, xk)nk=1] is uniformly bounded from above by 1 + ǫ.
It remains to show that we can let ǫ = 0. We argue as follows. By coherence,
Reality can always choose xn such thatMn(xn−mn)+Vn((xn−mn)2−vn) ≤ 0.
In the unbounded forecasting, unless (Mn, Vn) = (0, 0), Reality can choose xn
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such that this inequality is strict. Reality will look for the first time n =
n0 such that (Mn, Vn) 6= (0, 0). At round n0 Reality chooses xn0 such that
Kn0 [(µk,mk, xk)n0k=1] < 1. For n = 1, . . . , n0 − 1, Reality chooses xn such that
KPn ≤ 0. Now define α = Kn0 [(µk,mk, xk)n0k=1] and after the round n0 Reality
follows the strategy ensuring Kn ≤ 1, n > n0, as in (19). On the other hand, if
there is no such n0, then Reality keeps choosing xn such that KPn ≤ 0. In this
case Kn[(µk,mk, xk)nk=1] = 1 for all n and also (i) of Definition 4.9 is satisfied
by (18).
We now state the following theorem.
Theorem 4.12. Let g : R → R be a positive increasing function. Then in the
unbounded forecasting Reality strongly complies with the event
∑
n
vn
g(An)
=∞⇒
∑
k≤n(xk −mk)√
g(An)
does not converge. (21)
As an immediate consequence of this theorem we have the following corollary.
Corollary 4.13. Let g : R → R be a positive increasing function. Let E1 be
any event depending only on v1, v2, . . . , such that E1 ∩ {
∑
n
vn
g(An)
= ∞} 6= ∅.
In the unbounded forecasting Skeptic can not force
E1 ⇒
∑
k≤n(xk −mk)√
g(An)
converges.
For proving Theorem 4.12 we prove two technical lemmas.
Lemma 4.14. Let {yn} be a sequence of reals and let {gn} be a non-decreasing
sequence of positive reals. If (
∑
k≤n yk)/gn converges to d, then |yn/gn| ≤ |d|+1
for all but finite n.
Proof. First note that∣∣∣∣yngn
∣∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣yngn − d
(
1− gn−1
gn
)∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣d
(
1− gn−1
gn
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ |d|+
∣∣∣∣yngn − d
(
1− gn−1
gn
)∣∣∣∣ .
Therefore it suffices to show that∣∣∣∣yngn − d
(
1− gn−1
gn
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1
for all sufficiently large n.
Let ǫ be such that 0 < ǫ ≤ 13 . Then there exists N such that
n > N ⇒
∣∣∣∣
∑n
k=1 yk
gn
− d
∣∣∣∣ < ǫ.
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It follows that, for all n− 1 > N ,∣∣∣∣yngn − d ·
(
1− gn−1
gn
)∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣yngn −
∑n−1
k=1 yk
gn−1
·
(
1− gn−1
gn
)∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣
∑n−1
k=1 yk
gn−1
− d
∣∣∣∣∣ ·
(
1− gn−1
gn
)
<
∣∣∣∣∣
∑n
k=1 yk
gn
−
∑n−1
k=1 yk
gn−1
∣∣∣∣∣+ ǫ ≤
∣∣∣∣
∑n
k=1 yk
gn
− d
∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣
∑n−1
k=1 yk
gn−1
− d
∣∣∣∣∣+ ǫ < 3ǫ.
Lemma 4.15. Let {an} be a sequence of positive reals. Then there exists a
sequence {ǫn} of positive reals such that
(i) ǫn is determined only by a1, · · · , an,
(ii) ǫnan ≤ 1,
(iii)
∑
n an =∞ implies
∑
n ǫnan =∞ and ǫn → 0.
Proof. We define ǫn as follows.
(P1) Let n = b = c = 1.
(P2) If 2−ban ≥ 1 then let ǫn = 1/an, otherwise ǫn = 2−b, i.e. let ǫn =
min(1/an, 2−b).
(P3) If
∑n
k=c ǫkak ≥ 1 then let b = b+ 1, and c = n+ 1.
(P4) Let n = n+ 1 and goto (P2).
It is clear that (i) and (ii) are satisfied. We shall prove that (iii) is satisfied.
Suppose that
∑
n an =∞.
We claim that
∑n
k=c ǫkak ≥ 1 in (P3) for infinitely many times. Otherwise,
b and c do not change from some point. Also, in view of
n∑
k=c
ǫkak < 1 ⇒ ǫnan < 1 ⇒ ǫn = e−b,
ǫn = 2
−b for all but finite n. It follows that
∑
k≥c 2
−bak < 1. This contradicts
to the fact that
∑
n an =∞.
Then there exists an increasing sequence {ci} such that
∑ci+1
k=ci+1
ǫkak ≥ 1.
It follows that
∑
n ǫnan =∞.
Since b goes to infinity and ǫn ≤ 2−b in (P2), we have ǫn → 0.
We are now ready to give a proof of Theorem 4.12. Before starting a formal
proof, we discuss the idea of the proof. By Proposition 4.10 we wish Skeptic
could force the divergence. As we saw in the Lemma 4.3, however, it is not easy
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for Skeptic to force the divergence in the unbounded forecasting. So we use the
bounded forecasting, more precisely, the game restricted to three points as in
Proposition 3.6.
It is suffices to show that Skeptic can force (21) in the restricted protocol by
the following reason. Consider the following three statements.
(i) Skeptic can force the event in the restricted protocol.
(ii) Reality strongly complies with the event in the restricted protocol.
(iii) Reality strongly complies with the event in the unbounded forecasting.
The implication (ii)⇒(iii) holds by the following simple argument. Suppose
that Reality strongly complies with it in the restricted protocol. Then Reality
can use the same strategy in the unrestricted protocol or in the unbounded
forecasting.
The implication (i)⇒(ii) follows from Proposition 4.10. Note that the re-
stricted protocol Skeptic can use a strategy with Vn ≤ 0 in order to force (21).
In the unrestricted protocol this is not allowed. It is Reality who refers this
Skeptic’s strategy to make her strategy.
To prove (i), we use the trinomial game (cf. Corollary 3.5 and Proposition
3.6). In other words we construct a reduction from the restricted protocol
to the trinomial game. Then since Skeptic can force the divergence in the
trinomial game, Skeptic can also force the divergence in the restricted protocol.
This argument of the reduction is often seen in computability theory [21, 22],
complexity theory [1] and algorithmic randomness [4, 19].
We now give a formal proof.
Proof of Theorem 4.12. For notational simplicity we write yn = xn −mn, gn =√
g(An) and zn = yn/gn. Let ǫn ≥ 0 be such that ǫ2n is a sequence of Lemma
4.15 for an =
vn
g(An)
. We restrict Reality’s moves as ǫnzn ∈ {0,±1}. The capital
process is
Kn = Kn−1 +Mn(xn −mn) + Vn((xn −mn)2 − vn)
= Kn−1 +Mn gn
ǫn
ǫnzn + Vn
g(An)
ǫ2n
(
(ǫnzn)
2 − ǫ2n
vn
g(An)
)
= Kn−1 +M ′n(x′n −m′n) + V ′n((x′n −m′n)2 − v′n).
Then Kn can be seen as a capital process in Corollary 3.5 where Forecaster
announces m′n = 0 and v
′
n = ǫ
2
n
vn
g(An)
, Skeptic announces M ′n = Mn
gn
ǫn
and
V ′n = Vn
g(An)
ǫ2
n
and Reality announces x′n = ǫnzn ∈ {0,±1}. Note that v′n ∈ [0, 1]
because of the definition of ǫn. Since |ǫnzn| is bounded, Vn can also be negative
in the restricted protocol. Hence, by Corollary 3.5, Skeptic can force that∑
n
ǫ2n
vn
g(An)
=∞⇒ ǫnzn = ±1 for infinitely many n
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and Reality can choose her move such that Kn ≤ Kn−1 ≤ · · · ≤ K0 = 1 for all
n.
By the definition of ǫn we have
∑
n
vn
g(An)
= ∞ ⇒ ∑n ǫ2n vng(An) = ∞. Fur-
thermore If ǫn|zn| = 1 for infinitely many n then |zn| = 1/ǫn for infinitely many
n and supn |zn| =∞ by ǫ2n → 0 and ǫn → 0. It follows that (
∑
k≤n yk)/gn does
not converge by Lemma 4.14.
We can summarize the results of this section as follows. Consider a game in
which Skeptic wins when
∑
k≤n(xk−mk)√
g(An)
converges. If both players do the best,
then the winner depends only on whether
∑
n
vn
g(An)
<∞ or not. In other words
in order to make it converge we need a function g such that
∑
n
vn
g(An)
<∞. As
we have already seen in Example 4.7 this g grows faster than n log logn that
appears in LIL.
A measure-theoretic interpretation is as follows. Let mn and vn be the
conditional mean and the conditional variance. Under any probability measure,
if
∑
n
vn
g(An)
< ∞, then ∑k≤n xk−mk√g(Ak) converges a.s. Now consider the case∑
n
vn
g(An)
=∞. There exists a probability measure, such that if∑n vng(An) =∞
then
∑
k≤n
xk−mk√
g(Ak)
does not converge a.s.
5 Rate of convergence of SLLN under a general
hedge
Theorem 4.4 can be seen as an extension of SLLN. In contrast Kumon, Takemura
and Takeuchi [13] proved another extension. Furthermore both extensions have
similar forms. To clarify a relation between these two extensions we consider a
protocol with a general hedge.
Unbounded Forecasting with General Hedge (UFGH)
Parameters: A single hedge h : R→ R
Players: Forecaster, Skeptic, Reality
Protocol:
K0 = 1.
FOR n = 1, 2, . . .:
Forecaster announces mn ∈ R and vn > 0.
Skeptic announces Mn ∈ R and Vn ≥ 0.
Reality announces xn ∈ R.
Kn := Kn−1 +Mn(xn −mn) + Vn(h(xn −mn)− vn).
Collateral Duties: Skeptic must keep Kn non-negative. Reality
must keep Kn from tending to infinity.
We assume a few conditions for h : R→ R.
(A0) h(x) = h(|x|) ≥ 0.
(A1) For some c > 0, h(x)/x is monotone increasing for x > c.
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(A2) For some c > 0, h(x)/x2 is monotone decreasing for x > c.
In (A2) we are considering hedges weaker than the quadratic hedge, which
is our main interest in this section. The implications of hedges stronger than
the quadratic hedge to the rate of SLLN are investigated by recent papers of
Takazawa ([26], [25]).
5.1 The case of convergence
The following theorem is a generalization of Theorem 4.4 to the general hedge.
Theorem 5.1. Suppose that h satisfies (A0)-(A2) and that g is a positive in-
creasing function. Then in UFGH Skeptic can force
∑
n
vn
g(An)
<∞⇒
n∑
k=1
xk −mk
h−1 ◦ g(Ak) converges.
Corollary 5.2. In UFGH Skeptic can force
∑
n
vn <∞⇒
n∑
k=1
(xk −mk) converges.
and
∑
n
vn =∞ and
∑
n
vn
g(An)
<∞⇒
∑n
k=1(xk −mk)
h−1 ◦ g(An) → 0.
This corollary follows from the theorem and Kronecker’s lemma.
Notice that Theorem 5.1 with h(x) = x2 implies Theorem 4.4. In contrast
Theorem 5.1 with g(x) = h(x/ν), mn = 0 and vn = ν implies Theorem 3.1 of
[13].
The rest of this section is devoted to a proof of Theorem 5.1. The proof is
just a straightforward combination of that of Theorem 4.4 and that of Theorem
3.1 of [13]. Note that, without loss of generality, we assume that mn = 0 for all
n.
Remark 5.3. We can assume that c in (A1) and (A2) are 0 and h(x) = x2
for |x| ≤ 1 by the following reason. Let c be such that h(x)/x is monotone
increasing and h(x)/x2 is monotone decreasing for x > c. Let
h0(x) =
{
h(c)
c x if |x| ≤ c
h(x) otherwise.
Then h0 satisfies (A1) and (A2) for x ≥ 0. It also follows that h−1(y) ≥ 0 is
defined for y ≥ 0.
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By this remark we assume that c in (A1) and (A2) are 0. Let
h1(x) =
{
x2 if |x| ≤ 1
h(h−1(1) · x) otherwise.
Then h1 satisfies (A0)-(A2). Furthermore, for large x, h1(x) = h(h
−1(1) ·x) = y
and h−1(y) = h−1(1) · x = h−1(1) · h−11 (y). Then the convergence does not
depend on the use of h and h1. We also have h(x)/x
2 ≤ 1.
Lemma 5.4. In UFGH Skeptic can force
∑
n
vn
g(An)
<∞⇒
∑
n
h(xn)
g(An)
<∞.
Proof. Consider the strategies such that
K0 = D, Mn = 0, Vn = 1
g(An)
as long as Kn is non-negative for all xn where D is a natural number. If∑
n vn/g(An) < D then the capital process Kn is
Kn = D +
n∑
k=1
h(xk)− vk
g(Ak)
.
If
∑
n vn/g(An) < ∞ and
∑
n h(xn)/g(An) = ∞, then limnKn = ∞. This
proves the lemma.
Lemma 5.5. Under the conditions (A0), In UFGH Skeptic can force
∑
n
vn
g(An)
<∞⇒ |xn| ≥ h−1 ◦ g(An)
for only finitely many n.
Proof. Notice that
|xn| ≥ h−1 ◦ g(An)
implies
h(xn)
g(An)
≥ 1.
Then the result follows from Lemma 5.4.
Lemma 5.6. Under the conditions (A0) and (A2), In UFGH Skeptic can force
∑
n
vn
g(An)
<∞⇒
∑
n
x2n
(h−1 ◦ g(An))2 <∞.
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Proof. By Lemma 5.5 we only consider the case xn ≤ h−1 ◦ g(An). By (A2),
h(x)/x2 is monotone decreasing for x > 0. Hence
h(xn)
x2n
≥ h ◦ h
−1 ◦ g(An)
(h−1 ◦ g(An))2 .
It follows that
x2n
(h−1 ◦ g(An))2 ≤
h(xn)
g(An)
.
Then the result follows from Lemma 5.4.
Lemma 5.7. Let ǫ be such that 0 < ǫ < 14 . Under the conditions (A0) and
(A1), for all x and n
vn
g(An)
≤ 1⇒ −ǫ |x|
h−1 ◦ g(An) + ǫ
h(x)− vn
g(An)
≥ −1
2
. (22)
Proof. By (A1), for x ≥ h−1 ◦ g(An),
h(x)
x
≥ g(An)
h−1 ◦ g(An) .
It follows that
h(x)
g(An)
− x
h−1 ◦ g(An) ≥ 0.
For 0 ≤ x < h−1 ◦ g(An),
h(x)
g(An)
− x
h−1 ◦ g(An) > −1.
Therefore for all x ≥ 0 we have
h(x)− vn
g(An)
− x
h−1 ◦ g(An) > −1−
vn
g(An)
.
Lemma 5.8. Under the conditions (A0)-(A2), in UFGH Skeptic can force
∑
n
vn
g(An)
<∞⇒
∑
n
xn
h−1 ◦ g(An) converges.
Proof. We consider the following two strategies simultaneously such that K0 = 1
and
Mn = ±ǫKn−1 1
h−1 ◦ g(An) , Vn = ǫKn−1
1
g(An)
if vn/g(An) ≤ 1 and Mn = Vn = 0 otherwise, where 0 < ǫ < 1/4 is fixed. We
denote the corresponding two capital processes asK±n . Since
∑
n vn/g(An) <∞,
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we have vn/g(An) ≤ 1 for all but finite n. Hence we can assume that the
inequality in the right-side hand of (22) holds for all n. Then
K±n = K±n−1(1± ǫ
xn
h−1 ◦ g(An) + ǫ
h(xn)− vn
g(An)
) ≥ 1
2
K±n−1.
Hence K±n > 0 for all n. By the game-theoretic martingale convergence theorem,
both K±n converge to a non-negative finite value.
By the inequality t ≥ log(1 + t) ≥ t− t2 for all t ≥ −1/2,
ǫ
n∑
k=1
( ±xn
h−1 ◦ g(Ak) +
h(xk)− vk
g(Ak)
)
≥ logK±n
≥ ǫ
n∑
k=1
( ±xk
h−1 ◦ g(Ak) +
h(xk)− vk
g(Ak)
)
− ǫ2
n∑
k=1
( ±xk
h−1 ◦ g(Ak) +
h(xk)− vk
g(Ak)
)2
.
Notice that each of the following infinite sums is finite;
∑
n
h(xn)
g(An)
,
∑
n
vn
g(An)
,
∑
n
x2n
(h−1 ◦ g(An))2 ,
∑
n
h(xn)
2
g(An)2
,
∑
n
v2n
g(An)2
.
By the inequality
(a1 + · · ·+ am)2 ≤ m(a21 + · · ·+ a2m)
we have
n∑
k=1
( ±xk
h−1 ◦ g(Ak) +
h(xk)− vk
g(Ak)
)2
<∞.
It follows that
sup
n
n∑
k=1
±xn
h−1 ◦ g(Ak) <∞.
Hence both logK±n converge to a finite value. Therefore we obtain the desired
result.
5.2 The case of divergence
We now consider the case of divergence of
∑
n vn/g(An).
Theorem 5.9. Suppose that h satisfies (A0)-(A2) and that g is a positive in-
creasing function. Then in UFGH Reality strongly complies with
∑
n
vn
g(An)
=∞⇒
n∑
k=1
xk −mk
h−1 ◦ g(Ak) does not converge. (23)
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Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 4.12. We will consider the
protocol such that Reality’s move is restricted for each n. We shall show that
Skeptic can force (23) and Reality strongly complies with (23) in this protocol.
Let yn = xn − mn, gn = h−1 ◦ g(An) and zn = yn/gn. We restrict zn ∈
{0,±1}. If |zn| = 1 then h(yn) = h(gn) = g(An). If zn = 0 then h(yn) = h(0) =
0. In any cases we have h(yn) = g(An)z
2
n.
The capital process is
Kn = Kn−1 +Mngnzn + Vng(An)
(
z2n −
vn
g(An)
)
.
By Corollary 3.5, Skeptic can force∑
n
vn
g(An)
=∞⇒ |zn| = 1 for infinitely many n
and Reality can choose xn such that Kn ≤ Kn−1 and hence supnKn ≤ 1. If
|zn| = 1 for infinitely many n, then
∑
n yn/gn does not converge. Hence Skeptic
can force (23).
We will show that
∑
n
k=1
(xk−mk)
h−1◦g(An)
does not converge under the additional
condition h(xy) = h(x)h(y) for all x, y ≥ 0. However this condition implies
h(x) = xr and h−1(x) = x1/r for x ≥ 0. Taking into account of (A1)-(A2) we
have 1 ≤ r ≤ 2.
Theorem 5.10. Let h(x) = xr where 1 ≤ r ≤ 2 and g be a positive increasing
function. Then Reality strongly complies with
∑
n
vn
g(An)
=∞⇒
∑n
k=1(xk −mk)
h−1 ◦ g(An) does not converge.
Proof. Let yn = xn−mn, gn = h−1 ◦ g(An) and zn = yn/gn. This time let {ǫn}
be such that h(ǫn) is a sequence of Lemma 4.15 for
vn
g(An)
. We can assume that
0 < ǫn ≤ 1 for all n. We restrict ǫnzn ∈ {0,±1}. Then we have
h(yn)− vn =h(gn)h(zn)− vn = g(An)
h(ǫn)
(
h(ǫnzn)− h(ǫn) vn
g(An)
)
=
g(An)
h(ǫn)
(
(ǫnzn)
2 − h(ǫn) vn
g(An)
)
.
Hence the capital process is
Kn = Kn−1 +Mnyn + Vn(h(yn)− vn)
= Kn−1 +Mn gn
ǫn
ǫnzn + Vn
g(An)
h(ǫn)
(
(ǫnzn)
2 − h(ǫn) vn
g(An)
)
.
By Corollary 3.5, Skeptic can force∑
n
h(ǫn)
vn
g(An)
=∞⇒ ǫn|zn| = 1 for infinitely many n
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and Reality can choose xn such that Kn ≤ Kn−1 and hence Kn ≤ 1. The rest
of the proof is the same as that of Theorem 4.12.
One may think that this result contradicts Marcinkiewicz-Zygmund strong
law, which says that for i.i.d. random variables {xn} with E|xn|r < ∞ for
0 < r < 2 and Exn = 0 when 1 ≤ r < 2, n−1/r(
∑n
k=1 xk)→ 0 as n→∞ a.s.
For example let mn = 0, vn = v for all n and g(x) = x/v. Then gn =
(g(An))
1/r = n1/r and ǫnzn = ǫnyn/gn = ǫnxn/n
1/r. By ǫnzn ∈ {0,±1} we
have xn ∈ {0,±n1/r/ǫn}. Since ǫn → 0, we have n1/r/ǫn → ∞ as n → ∞.
It follows that the restrictions of xn are not the same. Thus this is not a
contradiction.
Theorem 5.1 and Theorem 5.9 give the rate of convergence of SLLN under
a general hedge in a non-identical case.
6 Discussion
In the classical three-series theorem, under the assumption of independence of
random variables, the necessary and sufficient condition for the convergence of
a random series is given by the convergence of three series: truncation proba-
bilities, truncated expected values and truncated variances. On the other-hand
Gilat’s counter example shows that the necessity of the convergence of three
series can not hold for martingales. Therefore a question of interest is to specify
some conditions, other than the independence, under which the convergence of
a random series implies the convergence of three series. We have shown that
under the convergence of a random series, the divergence of truncated means
can only occur as two-sided unbounded oscillation. We also gave some sim-
ple conditions of convergences of truncated means and variances, but stronger
results are desirable.
We proposed the notion of compliance concerning Reality’s deterministic
strategy. We showed that a good deterministic strategy of Reality can be auto-
matically constructed by using a good strategy for Skeptic as a “surrogate”. In
Definition 4.9 we made a distinction between compliance and strong compliance
concerning Reality’s deterministic strategy. Further study is needed to clarify
the difference between these definitions.
We gave the precise limit of the rate of convergence of SLLN with the
quadratic hedge as well as more general weaker hedges. According to it the
rate of convergence for a non-identical case may be slower than for the i.i.d.
case. We believe that game-theoretic probability is a powerful tool for analysis
of such a non-identical case.
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